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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
JURISPRUDENTIAL LECTURE SERIES*
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE DECLINE OF
PRIVATE PROPERTY
Joseph L. Sax**
A case could be made for the proposition that property rights have been
in a state of more-or-less continuous decline for many decades, and that
there is nothing to report on that front but more of the same. I do not
agree. I believe that we have moved in recent years from a situation (char-
acterized by conventional urban zoning) in which we generally encourage
developmental rights, though recognizing they must from time to time be
restrained, to one in which developmental activity has itself become sus-
pect. As a result, we are in the midst of a major transformation ifi which
property rights are being fundamentally redefined to the disadvantage of
property owners.
Because this transition is, by and large, taking place without compen-
sation, it has become commonplace for courts to describe what is occur-
ring in conventional terms. The proliferation of recent historic preserva-
tion laws is routinely characterized, for example, as if it were nothing but
a continuation of long-accepted zoning practices.1 In fact, I submit, such
laws and many others-wetlands and coastal protection, 2 open space
* The Washington Law Review Jurisprudential Lecture Series, now in its tenth year, is designed
to bring outstanding speakers to the Law School to discuss contemporary legal issues. The Review
gratefully acknowledges the generous financial assistance provided by the Evans Bunker Memorial
Fund.
** Philip A. Hart Distinguished University Professor, University of Michigan Law School.
I. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
905 (1975); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964). One judge
has recognized the phenomenon: "[L]egislatures and courts are adding a new dimension which may
do violence to constitutional private property rights, for now we hold that a private property owner
must make his property available without compensation for public view." First Presbyterian Church
v. City Council, 25 Pa. Commw. 154, 360 A.2d 257, 263 (1976) (Kramer, J., concurring).
2. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); Turnpike Realty
Co. v. Town of Dedham, 72 Mass. 1303, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108
(1973). One feature of the California Coastal Act of 1976 is protection of environmentally sensitive
habitat areas from any significant disruption in at least a 1000-yard zone inland of the mean high-tide
line. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30,103, 30,240(a) (West 1977). Cf. Buttrey v. United States, 690 F.2d
1170, 1177 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The government.., has merely told Buttrey that ... he must keep
what he has without attempting to make it worth more."), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2087 (1983).
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zoning, 3 growth control4 and the resurgent public trust doctrine 5 -mark a
transition the full effects of which have hardly begun to be recognized or
felt.
As good an example as any is the recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 6
After dutifully reciting all the conventional cases in which regulation
without compensation was sustained, the majority in effect concluded
that the city's refusal to allow Penn Central to build a high-rise above
Grand Central Station, which had been designated an architectural land-
mark, was indistinguishable from a half-century's land regulation and
zoning cases. 7 Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, insisted that something im-
portantly different was happening in Penn Central.8 He was right, but he
too failed to recognize the full significance of the majority's decision:
Rejection of the very claim that there existed a private property right ca-
pable of being taken.
What made Penn Central an unconventional case? For one thing, the
owner in that case was denied the opportunity to pursue an established
business expectation, though the majority opinion denied it.9 Building on
air rights had become a conventional economic activity, and one in which
many owners had invested great sums of money. 10
Moreover, the case cannot be justified on the conventional "external
harm" theory which is the source of most traditional property regula-
tion. I1 It cannot be said, for example, that the proposed use was a nui-
sance-like activity that would intrude on the uses others were making of
3. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). One case taking a position contrary
to that of the Supreme Court in Agins was later vacated. Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto,
401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated, 417 F. Supp. 1125 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138,
appeal dismissed sub nom. Rockland County Builders Ass'n v. McAlevey, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972);
Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
934 (1976); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
5. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr.
346 (1983); City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 31 Cal. 3d 288, 644 P.2d 792, 182
Cal. Rptr. 599 (1982), cert. granted sub nom. Summa Corp. v. California, 103 S. Ct. 1425 (1983);
City of Berkeley v. Superior Ct., 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 840 (1980); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1968); The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law and
Management:A Symposium, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 181 (1980).
6. 438 U.S. 104(1978).
7. Id. at 128-35.
8. See id. at 138-53.
9. See infra text at 494-95.
10. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116; Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39
N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990
(1976).
11. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 144-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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their property. 12 Unlike the case in which an owner wishes to build a
factory or to maintain a quarry in a residential neighborhood, Penn Cen-
tral only asked to be allowed to do what its neighbors had already done, to
construct a high-rise building. Neither can it be said-beyond the limits
of so-called noxious uses or nuisances-that there was even a conflict
between the uses Penn Central wanted to make of its property and those
that its neighbors wanted to make of theirs. 13 Thus, Penn Central was not
a case like Miller v. Schoene, 14 in which some choice had to be made
between competing and incompatible uses, neither of which could be
viewed as wrongful. This illustrates the distinctiveness of the Penn Cen-
tral decision, because Miller v. Schoene has long been viewed as at the
outer limit of permissible regulation.
Moreover, as Justice Rehnquist emphasized in his dissent, there was no
plausible reciprocity of advantage in the case, a feature common to much
traditional zoning. 15 Indeed, Penn Central is precisely the opposite of a
reciprocity case; one landowner was prevented from doing something that
all his neighbors had been permitted to do. And he was prevented not
because he had done something wrongful or intrusive, but because he had
done something admirable-he had built an architecturally distinguished
building.
The most accurate way of looking at Penn Central is to say that the
owner was required to continue conferring a benefit on his neighbors. The
owner's situation in Penn Central resembles the situation of a landowner
who has, up to the present time, refrained from building on his lot,
thereby providing his neighbors a scenic amenity. Now he wishes to stop
providing that benefit, and to use his property as his neighbors have al-
ready used their adjoining tracts. Yet the law requires him to continue
bestowing amenity value upon his neighbors even though they have no
similar obligation. How can such a result be explained or justified? That
is the question Justice Rehnquist raised, and the majority opinion in the
case provides no satisfactory answer.
12. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brickyard); Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (sand and gravel mining).
13. Conflict rather than wrongfulness has always been the principal feature of regulatory cases.
See generally Sax, Taking, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971) (govern-
ment regulation as conflict resolution); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 48-50
(1964) (regulatory cases better explained by incompatibility of uses than by external harm).
14. 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (no deprivation of property without due process of law by the state
requiring destruction of ornamental cedar trees in order to avoid infecting apple orchards in the vicin-
ity with cedar rust).
15. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 139-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The "reciprocity of ad-
vantage" concept was enunciated by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393,415 (1922).
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In the pages that follow I propose an explanation of why cases like
Penn Central are being decided as they are. I argue that Penn Central and
its companions do not turn on the compensation/no compensation issue,
which has traditionally dominated legal thinking about property. Instead,
they address the allocational function of property. Put as bluntly as possi-
ble my thesis is this: We have endowed individuals and enterprises with
property because we assume that the private ownership system will allo-
cate and reallocate the property resource to socially desirable uses. Any
such allocational system will, of course, fail from time to time. But when
the system regularly fails to allocate property to "correct" uses, we begin
to lose faith in the system itself. Just as older systems of property, like
feudal tenures, declined as they became nonfunctional, so our own sys-
tem is declining to the extent it is perceived as a functional failure. Since
such failures are becoming increasingly common, the property rights that
lead to such failures are increasingly ceasing to be recognized. Thus, the
interesting question in the Penn Central case is not why the owner failed
to receive compensation, but why private ownership of Grand Central
Station did not lead to the correct allocation, that is, to maintaining the
property as an unobstructed, architecturally distinctive railroad station.
In speaking of the "correct" allocation, I mean to suggest no omni-
science either on my part or that of the New York Landmarks Preserva-
tion Commission. Rather, I intend only to observe that in cases like Penn
Central and many other modem situations such as open space preserva-
tion or coastal protection, there is widespread agreement that nondevelop-
ment is the correct result, and widespread recognition that conventional
bargaining between the owner and potential users of the property is not
bringing about that result. I also mean to contrast the outcome in such
cases with an earlier belief that demolishing old structures so as to allow
vigorous new development was the right result. It is this difference rather
than the question whether the owner is being compensated or not that is
generating disillusionment with private developmental rights.
Before turning to the reasons for the perceived allocational failure of
traditional property, however, I want to comment briefly on the relation-
ship between compensation and allocation. One might say that the ability
of the public to avoid compensation significantly affects the allocation
decision, for the simple reason that the public will want something (pres-
ervation of an historic structure, for example) much more if it is free than
if it costs it millions of dollars. But the choice is not always that simple.
For example, if a high-rise is not built above Grand Central Station, the
public-whether or not it pays compensation to the owner-is foregoing
the benefits that come from development. As the employer and welfare
provider of last resort, it risks the loss of economic activity, of jobs and of
Vol. 58:481, 1983
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housing, losses not significantly felt by any individual. The public does
not casually eschew the benefits of economic development. For this rea-
son, one must view laws constraining development, such as historic pres-
ervation ordinances, as allocational choices that are not "free" to the
community even when no compensation is paid the owner. Such deci-
sions reflect changing public values, and not simply public avidity for
obtaining free benefits.
Why are values changing, and why does the property system not auto-
matically adapt to them? One important explanation may lie in the differ-
ence between the different kinds of benefits flowing from property-
"exclusive" and "nonexclusive" consumption benefits. In a case of ex-
clusive consumption (a residence or a shopping center, for example), vir-
tually all benefits flow exclusively to those who occupy and use the land.
In such a case, where there are no significant externalities, one expects
the direct users to be able to organize, calculate and bid for the opportu-
nity to enjoy those benefits. In general, the community as a whole is con-
tent to have the property allocated to whomever among such competing
exclusive use bidders is willing to make the highest bid. The conventional
property system is organized to facilitate such allocations, and such allo-
cations only.
If, however, the "competitors" include those who benefit from main-
tenance of an existing historic building, the consumption is nonexclusive.
That is to say, the number of people who will potentially benefit is much
greater: Benefits are not limited to actual occupants; the nature of the ben-
efits will differ among various people in the group; they are likely to be
quite small as to any individual; and there is no way of assuring that every
beneficiary will contribute, for benefits will flow to all potential benefici-
aries whether or not they have contributed (the so-called free-rider prob-
lem).
Moreover, it is often particularly difficult for any individual to calcu-
late the value of nonexclusive benefits to him. Such benefits often have a
substantial uncertainty or "option element" to them. One may be confi-
dent that he will benefit from the presence of the building in some way
(just as he benefits from the existence of many as-yet-unread books in the
public library), but it is much more difficult to put a price tag on that
value than to put such a price tag on his apartment or on a hamburger he
consumes.
For all these reasons-diffuseness, smallness of individual interest,
imperfect knowledge, differential values to a large number of people, and
difficulty of pricing-the likelihood that nonexclusive consumers will or-
ganize to bid, and to bid the "right" price for such benefits, is doubtful.
Of course these very uncertainties also suggest reasons to lack confi-
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dence in the intervention of government to allocate the land to a given
nonexclusive consumptive use through a legal mandate. What I have said
to this point seeks to demonstrate not that allocation through law, rather
than through bidding, is necessarily right, but only that allocation through
conventional bidding-whereby the maximization of profit to the owner
is assumed to produce the correct allocation-is fraught with difficulties.
When nonexclusive consumption benefits are very small by compari-
son to exclusive consumption values, the traditional system of allocation
functions well. But as nonexclusive benefits rise in importance, the ca-
pacity of traditional private property transactions to allocate satisfactorily
diminishes, and in such circumstances one should not be surprised to see
diminishing confidence in the property system as an engine of allocation.
Another element of nonexclusive consumption makes private alloca-
tion through the property system still more unreliable. This element is
what has sometimes, in a different context, been called the bandwagon
effect. This effect describes a situation in which the value of something to
any given individual is itself dependent on whether it has value to others.
To take a banal example, the value to me of some fashionable item, like
designer blue jeans, is linked to the fact that others value it. The value of
my consumption to me is determined by the praise, support, or envy that
others yield me as a result of my consumption. This phenomenon has an
important and serious implication for things like historic preservation or
wilderness. Some of the value of such things doubtless lies in their capac-
ity to stimulate feelings of national identity or cultural solidarity, and
their value to any individual rises as they are embraced by the entire com-
munity as public values.
I may, for example, derive benefits from using the wilderness as a
hiker, or some historic site as a visitor, but I may also derive some bene-
fits from wilderness or historic preservation in some remote area I will
never use or see, arising from the commitment of Americans to preserve
wilderness as a community value. A commitment to wilderness (or to
symbols of America's historic greatness) yields such value to any given
individual only if the community as a whole treats it as important. And in
such cases the evidence of such value is an act of commitment by the
whole community, such as embracing the national policy of historic pres-
ervation, wilderness, the flag or any of a host of symbols of national char-
acter or identity.
In such a case, even if a number of individuals could organize to bid for
preservation and could outbid other potential users, that bid would not
necessarily measure the whole value of preservation. Preservation may be
more valuable to me simply because there is a community-wide commit-
ment to preservation. Thus, for example, French people value their his-
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toric chateaux not only for their beauty, but also because the nation has
"adopted" them as symbols of national greatness. Such benefit valuation
can only be expressed through the instrumentality of the political commu-
nity, which in practice means through government. Thus, the participa-
tion of the government using a legal mandate may serve not only as a
device to identify the bidding value for a nonexclusive use, but also as a
device for expressing a kind of value in addition to the sum of all purely
individual uses or benefits.
As nonexclusive consumption values rise in importance, and the capac-
ity of the property system to make correct allocations thereby diminishes,
it seems inevitable that we begin to ask ourselves why we allow those
private property rights to exist which increasingly produce unwanted re-
sults. At least as to land, where property rights are assigned by the public
in the first instance (and putting aside those things that are more or less
entirely the product of an individual's own creative efforts, such as a
symphony or a poem), the assignment of property rights presupposes that
private ownership would routinely produce socially desirable use alloca-
tions.
We assigned property to private owners in the undeveloped West, for
example, because we assumed that the uses they would make of the prop-
erty-settlement, security of the frontier, development of railroads, farms
and mines-would maximize net social benefits. Had we not believed
that the allocations brought about by private ownership would produce
such results, it hardly seems likely that such rights would have been cre-
ated. The application of a new kind of water right for the ard West in
place of traditional riparian rights pointedly illustrates this assumption. 16
One may also test it against the current debate over the proposed sale of
public lands remaining in federal ownership.
It is, I suggest, precisely because it is widely believed that the highest
and best use of much of that land lies in its retention for nondevelopmen-
tal, nonexclusive uses, such as public recreation, wilderness and wildlife
habitat, that there is strong resistance against selling it into private owner-
ship. If it is believed that private ownership likely will not, for the reasons
I have suggested above, sufficiently allocate the land to such nonexclu-
sive uses, it is only to be expected that private rights will not be estab-
lished. 17
The difficulty with land already patented into private ownership, of
course, is one of fairness to the owners in the face of changing values,
and I shall have something to say about that later. What I wish to empha-
16. E.g., Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo.
443 (1882).
17. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
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size, however, is not the compensation issue, but the growing conviction
that for substantial areas of land the content of private ownership rights
that we have long relied on is misallocating the land, and that what was
long viewed as exceptional (government intervention to allocate cor-
rectly) is becoming commonplace. This change cannot help but impose
enormous pressure upon our conception of the role that private ownership
in land should play.
We have already seen some remarkable transformations, of which the
rise of historic preservation ordinances is but one example. The perceived
dominating importance of nonexclusive uses of shoreline has already
given rise in the last decade to a greatly revived public trust doctrine. 18 In
that instance, the path of a judicially led transformation was paved by a
long-though largely moribund-tradition of government retention of
public rights in submerged shoreland that were never transferred into pri-
vate ownership. The tradition was often ignored in the mid-nineteenth
century, especially in places like California, where vast acreages of sub-
merged shoreline were passed into private ownership to encourage de-
velopment.
At the time, the private ownership of these lands seemed absolute. As
the need for nonexclusive uses of the lands rose in the last decade, and as
the availability of such lands shrank, we witnessed some remarkable judi-
cial pyrotechnics. For instance, recent California Supreme Court deci-
sions have redefined the nature of the grants made by the legislature in the
1860's, 19 questioned longstanding property rights in water, 20 and expli-
citly reversed previous decisions holding that absolute private rights had
been granted, 21 thereby reinstating the public right of nonexclusive use on
the inventive theory of implicit reservations in grants made more than a
century ago.
However shocking such results may be to conventional legal sensibili-
ties, they reveal a trend that is equally obvious in a range of other areas.
That trend is exemplified not only by Penn Central but also by contempo-
rary decisions upholding open space, coastal and wetland zoning. 22
Nonexclusive consumption benefits have always existed. Why should
they be less in harmony with the property system now than they were in
the past? The reasons, I suggest, are two, both related to the developmen-
18. See supra note 5.
19. City of Berkeley v. Superior Ct., 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
20. National Audubon Soe'y v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346
(1983).
21. City of Berkeley v. Superior Ct., 26 Cal. 3d at 532, 606 P.2d at 372, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
22. Perhaps the most notable case is Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761
(1972). See also supra note 2.
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tal use of property. First, the more development proceeds, the more the
stock of such benefits (coastal access, historic structures, wilderness) de-
clines. Second, and even more important, values are changing, so that the
quantum of benefits from developmental activity (both exclusive and non-
exclusive consumption benefits) is perceived as being less than it for-
merly was, while simultaneously the perceived benefits flowing from
nondevelopmental, nonexclusive consumption are sharply increasing.
The building of the railroads, the irrigation of the arid West, the electri-
fication of rural areas, the growth of great cities, even the belching steel
mills of Pittsburgh or Gary, idealized America on the march, putting the
world on wheels, serving as the breadbasket and the arsenal of democ-
racy. Such images were at least as powerful as the current imagery of the
wilderness or of our historic heritage. The nonexclusive consumption
benefits of a symbolic sort that flowed from these activities were in har-
mony with conventional exclusive consumption benefits that flowed to
users and builders. The profits that came to landowners in allocating
property to development automatically brought in their wake a sense of
common purpose to a public enlivened by an idea of progress tied to de-
velopment. The developmental rights of property owners were truly an
engine pulling us where we wanted to go.
Plainly, that animating sense of progress has declined. The change
might best be analogized to the mining of a valuable mineral. At first, the
richest lodes are mined, and the productive output is very great per acre of
land disturbed. As time goes on, the miner must move on to less and less
concentrated ores, more and more land must be disrupted, and more en-
ergy must be expended to get the same level of output. Over time the
benefits of developmental activity diminish, while the costs increase. Our
sense of progress diminishes.
One might also say generally of developmental activity that the most
important needs are taken care of first. As time passes the sense of accom-
plishment associated with new uses diminishes. Constructing suburban
shopping centers or producing instant cameras cannot be expected to gen-
erate the enthusiasm that went with building transcontinental railroads.
Those few contemporary activities that do excite us-the space program
or the development of the computer-are little involved with controver-
sies over resource use.
Of course, the transformation I have been describing is neither uniform
nor unidirectional. Some development is still perceived as essential, as in
a recent case where a long-established Detroit community, "Poletown,"
was destroyed to make way for a new General Motors plant.23 Such ex-
23. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455
(1981). See also Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1982).
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amples are likely to be particularly notable in periods of economic diffi-
culty such as we have been experiencing in the last few years. And, of
course, some developmental activity, such as maintaining the supply of
energy resources, is needed to sustain existing uses. An economy devoted
to sustenance, however, is more likely to generate interest in the tech-
niques of continuity, durability and sustained yield than in large-scale de-
velopment and expenditure of resources.
There is yet a third way of understanding the ongoing transformation in
the content of property rights. Social coherence demands evidence and
symbols of common purpose, self-worth and solidarity. As developmen-
tal activity ceases to provide those things and we are much less persuaded
that "America is on the march," we turn to other things. We seem to be
turning to symbols of stability, of links with our past. History is an obvi-
ous outlet for such values. So, though less obviously, is the interest in
ecology, a science focused on the stability and continuity of natural sys-
tems. It may be that as growth and development seem to become less
valuable guides for future well-being, those things that speak to suste-
nance, continuity, adaptation and evolutionary change rise sharply in
value. 24 All the sorts of laws to which I referred earlier appear in various
ways to speak to these themes: historic preservation, to the continuity of
the social order; wetland and coastline regulation, to the sustaining
marvel of productivity in the shorelands and estuaries; growth control, to
the maintenance of viable communities seen as threatened by explosive
and disorienting growth.
It is notable, in regard to the law of urban land use, that one sees in-
creasing emphasis in judicial opinions on the value of community stabil-
ity as a basis for restrictive laws, as compared with earlier nuisance-type
justifications. In the much quoted Belle Terre case, 25 the Supreme Court
upheld family-only zoning in language that at first seems faintly archaic.
It spoke of "family values, youth values, and the blessing of quiet seclu-
sion[,] ... a sanctuary for people." 26 Reliance on such values seems not
at all out of place when considered in terms of the transformation I have
been describing.
One could point to many examples of this change that reflect a shifting
emphasis even within the confines of the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act, 27 the model for conventional state laws that provide authorization for
24. See. e.g., J. SAX. MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NATIONAL PARKS
(1980).
25. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974).
26. Id. at 9.
27. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1924). The Act is no
longer in print in its original form as a publication of the U.S. Department of Commerce, but it is
reprinted in revised form in full in MODEL LAND DEV_ CODE app. A (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968).
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local zoning. The most familiar language of that law, and the part most
relied upon in the past, spoke to nuisance-type problems: "to lessen
congestion . . .; to secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to
promote health ... ; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue
concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of trans-
portation, water, sewerage ... and other public requirements. "28 For
many years, the standard cases drew upon that nuisance-like language. In
the leading zoning case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 29 for
example, the Supreme Court used the example of a pig in the parlor in-
stead of the barnyard.30 At one time billboard control was said to be justi-
fied because thieves and rapists could hide behind the signboards. 31 In
those days, development itself was viewed as the benefit and goal, and
any constraints on developmental activities were thought to be excep-
tional. Use-separation zoning was probably viewed mainly as a means to
facilitate-rather than to constrain-maximum development of the com-
munity as a whole.
Today one finds the promotion of nonexclusive benefits cited as a goal
in itself-a very significant change. Where once aesthetics were thought
an insufficient justification for zoning, today the Supreme Court easily
accepts aesthetic regulation of billboards, and Justice Rehnquist can say,
as he did in his dissent in the Metromedia case, "the aesthetic justifica-
tion alone is sufficient to sustain a total prohibition of billboards within a
community." 32 Similarly, the Court has recently noted-with no discus-
sion or difficulty-that open space zoning substantially advances legiti-
mate governmental goals, recognizing, though not deciding, that such
regulation may impose very substantial constraints on the totality of prop-
erty that would be developed. 33 It accepted the California legislature's
determination to prevent the "unnecessary conversion of open space land
to urban uses." ,34
Movement away from the nuisance justification for zoning in favor of
concern about neighborhood character, seeing the community as a com-
mon, reflects a shift from primary concern with exclusive consumption
28. Id. § 3.
29. 272U.S. 365 (1926).
30. Id. at 388.
31. "TIhe evidence also shows that behind these obstructions the lowest form of prostitution
and other acts of immorality are frequently carried on, almost under public gaze; they offer shelter
and concealment for the criminal while lying in wait for his victim .... St. Louis Gunning Adver-
tisement Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929, 942 (1911), appeal dismissed, 231
U.S. 761 (1913).
32. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 570 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing).
33. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
34. Id. at 261 (quoting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65,561(b) (West Supp. 1979)).
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(with its connotations of individualization and privatization) to nonexclu-
sive consumption (with its connotations of community and shared
values). Even where important individual rights are at stake, as in cases
involving the first amendment, one finds the Supreme Court, both in the
billboard case 35 and in the adult theatre zoning case, 36 evincing great
sympathy for the importance of maintaining community stability and
character. As one begins to see urban and suburban land use less through
the lens of individuals who have bought isolated tracts that need protec-
tion against intrusions from outside, and more as situations in which one
has acquired a package of common amenities-such as quality schools,
quietude, low levels of crime and the like-the values of nonexclusive
consumption and of commonly enjoyed benefits come to the fore.
To be sure, none of this is entirely new, and it could be argued that
even the most traditional zoning of a half-century ago was always more
community-oriented than its nuisance-type justification implied. It may
be that we are only now seeing the final result of a situation in which
belief in free-wheeling development and individualism on the one hand,
and the interest in community and what I have called nonexclusive con-
sumption benefits on the other, are finally reaching an unresolvable ten-
sion. With this change the importance of protection and preservation be-
comes greater, relatively speaking, than that of development. Historic
preservation looms larger than an additional high-rise; the coastline as a
public amenity becomes more significant than the coastline as a com-
modity to be divided up and given over to exclusive housing develop-
ment.
As I noted earlier, one sees precisely the same sort of changes occur-
ring in the management of the public lands. What were once viewed as
tracts largely to be parcelled out to timber companies and grazing and
mining interests are more and more perceived in terms of opportunities
for public recreation, for wildlife protection and reserves, and for archeo-
logical and paleontological sites. 37
I might note that the transition I have been describing is by no means
limited to land use. The change away from enchantment with the virtues
of productivity is also revealed in such small things as a resurgent interest
in the activities of artisans and in folklore, folk art and Native American
culture and its artifacts. In art and architecture, there has been a decline of
interest in the chrome and glass modernity that symbolized the industrial
era at its apex. It is no longer so obvious that traditional communities
35. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
36. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
37. See J. Sax, The Claim for Retention of the Public Lands (to be printed in RETHINKING THE
FEDERAL LANDS (S. Brubaker ed. (forthcoming)) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
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should be cavalierly displaced for a new dam. When an energy boom
town imposes itself upon an older community, that transformation is no
longer seen as pure progress; much more often it is seen as a tragedy,
though often still as an inevitable one. The disenchantment with urban
renewal's community-destroying aspects is just an older example of the
sort of attitudes that today are giving rise to the historic preservation
movement in many cities.
What all this suggests is a transition in which an ever greater proportion
of our well-being is realized in the form of shared wealth, or things that
are nonexclusively consumed, rather than in the form of privatized or ex-
clusive-consumption wealth. It seems a paradox that such changes should
be occurring simultaneously with the blossoming of the "me" generation
and the highly privatized gratification that goes with it. Perhaps the simul-
taneous rise of community-based nonexclusive benefits is a compensating
substitute for the loss of more traditional social values focused around
one's work and the more tightly-knit family.
Even where some of the output of nonexciusive consumption is priva-
tized, as with the goods of artisans, such values require collective effort
to maintain traditional cultures and communities. 38 As we are already
seeing, more attention is paid to assuring the quality of community-wide
amenities, and less to simply increasing the stock of private, exclusive-
possession goods. This means that developmental rights will increasingly
give way to protection of community-wide amenities.
I want finally to say something about the question that has traditionally
most concerned lawyers: the problem of compensation. If owners are to
lose developmental rights, should they not be compensated for that loss?
At one level, there is an easy, descriptive answer. They are losing such
rights and, as the various categories of cases to which I have been refer-
ring demonstrate, they are usually not being compensated. 39 Obviously, a
number of such owners are being sharply disappointed, by conventional
standards, in their expectations. Legislatures are alert to the problem, and
in many cases (such as historic preservation and inclusionary zoning) mi-
tigating benefits are being provided, though they fall far short of full com-
pensation. Among these are tax abatements, density bonuses, and trans-
ferable development rights. We are in a transitional state and legislatures
are using these devices to ease the pains of transition.
38. See Sax, In Search of Past Harmony, NAT. HIsT., Aug. 1982, at 42.
39' I do not mean to suggest that owners are never compensated. See, e.g., Fred F. French
Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, cert. denied
and appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). I merely suggest that noncompensation is increasingly
frequent. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); cases cited supra
note 2.
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It also has to be recognized that the unwillingness to compensate prop-
erty owners reflects a desire to bring about some redistribution, though it
is redistribution of a peculiar sort. In withdrawing developmental rights
(as opposed to existing uses), the legislatures and the courts are in fact
leaving in place some long-existing uses, such as open space, coastal ac-
cess, recreational opportunities, and historic structures. What is changing
is not the quantum of de facto nonexclusive benefits, but the quantum of
rights to destroy those benefits. Public privileges, long enjoyed, are be-
coming public rights.40
One justification for such redistribution is sometimes made explicit in
the cases, as it was in the New York Court of Appeals decision in Penn
Central.41 It is simply that so much of the value that inures to property
owners is itself the product of public investment in what we call infras-
tructure (transportation, utilities, etc.), rather than the product of individ-
ual enterprise, that the equitable claim owners have is really not so great.
This, too, is understandable in a society that is increasingly attuned to
land as community rather than as an amalgam of isolated, individualized
tracts. And it is, of course, a recognition by the courts of the old saw that
property owners grow rich in their sleep.
Finally, it is worth noting-and this may explain why the Supreme
Court in Penn Central rejected the claim of investment-backed expecta-
tions-that we are already so far along in diminishing developmental
rights that owners are viewed, in important respects, as already on notice.
Anyone today who holds, or wishes to buy, historical properties, wet-
lands or coastal lands, or who plans developments in developing suburbs
(to take but the most obvious examples), knows or should know that his
opportunities for old-fashioned development are far from clear. Even
such conventional strategies as acquiring property with the expectation of
obtaining a rezoning for denser development have now been put in ques-
tion in a number of states as a result of the so-called Fasano doctrine. 42
40. See Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine From Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C.D. L.
Rev. 185 (1980). A good illustration is provided by the beach access cases. See, e.g., Gion v. City of
Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254
Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969); Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964).
41. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 332, 366 N.E.2d 1271,
1275, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 918 (1977) ("Of primary significance, however, is that society as an orga-
nized entity, especially through its government, rather than as a mere conglomerate of individuals,
has created much of the value of the terminal property."), affd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
42. In Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973), the Oregon
Supreme Court shifted the burden of proof by abandoning the traditional presumption of validity and
requiring the county to justify zoning changes. 507 P.2d at 29. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Eastlake
v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), asserts that it is reasonable to expect zoning
changes to be granted freely. Id. at 682 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The expectancy that particular
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Surely canny owners must be learning to hedge their bets; the whole
structure of expectations is in the process of change. It would be fascinat-
ing to learn, for example, whether at the time the plans for the develop-
ment atop Grand Central Station were first put forward the developers
thought about the possibility of a denial based on historic preservation,
and whether their plans incorporated a hedge for that possibility.
In any event, the path of noncompensation seems rather clearly set, and
it is becoming clearer not only that there will be less development, but
also that owners will play a less central role in determining where the
development that is allowed will take place. Because more land will be
devoted in part to nonexclusive (and thus largely non-profit-producing)
consumption, the corollary observation is that what development is to be
allowed will more often be determined publicly rather than privately. Be-
cause developmental opportunities will be scarcer, those that continue to
exist are likely to be extremely profitable. One already sees this phenome-
non in operation in communities that have elaborate growth management
plans, such as Montgomery County, Maryland, where some areas are
designated for greenbelt and agriculture, others for low density, and still
others for high density development. 43 The same sort of thing can be seen
in places like Adirondack Park in New York, 44 on the federal public
lands, 45 and in the California Desert Conservation Area.46 Elaborate land
use planning schemes have zoned all of these areas for a variety of nonde-
velopmental and developmental uses.
A major problem I see ahead is one of controlling the potential for what
Professor Hagman called "windfalls" in those limited areas where de-
velopment will be concentrated. 47 To move in this direction we are going
to have to come to terms with the prospect that planning (a word Ameri-
cans don't much like), rather than property, is going to be a principal
engine of social benefit production in the future, and that public (nonex-
clusive) rather than privatized (exclusive) benefits are going to loom
changes consistent with the basic zoning plan will be allowed frequently and on their merits is a
normal incident of property ownership.").
43. See D. GODSCHALK. D. BROWER. L. MCBENNETr. B. VESTAL & D. HERR. CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT 309-27 (1979) (describing the Montgomery County Plan). A good
example of restrictive rural zoning can be found in the "Rural Zone" regulations of the Montgomery
County, Md., County Code. See id. at 318-21.
44. For an example of substantial restriction on development, see N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 805(3)(g)
(McKinney 1982).
45. See, for example, Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(3)
(1976), which gives priority to the protection of areas of critical environmental concern.
46. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR. THE CAL. DESERT CONSERVA-
TION AREA. FINAL ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT AND PROPOSED PLAN (1980).
47. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI. WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COM-
PENSATION (1978).
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much larger in long-term resource planning. These changes will not be
easily assimilated in American thought and the American legal system.
But the die is cast, and I see no evidence to suggest that the emerging
pattern I have here tried to describe will not continue in its current direc-
tion.
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